Montana Law Review
Volume 52
Issue 1 Winter 1991

Article 9

January 1991

Public Use of the Banks and Beds of Montana Streams
Albert W. Stone

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Albert W. Stone, Public Use of the Banks and Beds of Montana Streams, 52 Mont. L. Rev. (1991).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Stone: PUBLIC USE OF THE BANKS AND BEDS OF MONTANA STREAMS

PUBLIC USE OF THE BANKS AND BEDS OF
MONTANA STREAMS
Albert W. Stone*
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is nothing startling in the concept of a public trust as
applied to property owned by the state for the benefit of its people.
It has long been recognized in the navigable waters of the seas and
the lands underlying them,' as it has in the navigable waters of our
inland streams and their banks and beds belonging to the state.2
Our Montana Constitution provides expressly for a public trust in
waters by declaring:
All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters
within the boundaries of the state are the property of the state
for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law.'

Typically, when one entity owns and manages property "for
the use" or benefit of another, the relationship is one of trustee
and beneficiary. 4 If the beneficiary is the public, then the relation* Professor of Law, University of Montana. Member, California and Montana Bar.
B.A., University of California (Berkeley); J.D., Duke University. A principal draftsman of:
the Montana Groundwater Code, 1961 Mont. Laws 237 (current version at MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 85-2-501 to -520 (1989)); the Montana Water Conservancy Districts Act, 1969 Mont.
Laws. 100 (current version at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-9-101 to -632 (1989)); the Montana
Water Use Act, 1973 Mont. Laws 452 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101 to -807
(1989)); the Major Facility Siting Act, 1973 Mont. Laws 327 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 75-20-101 to -1205 (1989)); the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act, 1973 Mont. Laws
500 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-101 to -614 (1989)); the Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act, 1973 Mont. Laws 325 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§
82-4-201 to -254 (1989)).
1. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 6 (1935); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11, 1318 (1894); People ex rel. Webb v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 596-97, 138 P. 79, 87-88
(1913); 1 H. FARNHAM, LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, §§ 36, 36a, at 169-75 (1904); S.
MOORE, HISTORY AND LAW OF THE FORESHORE AND SEA SHORE, 651 n.1, 655-56 (3d ed. 1888);
Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water, in 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 177, at 190-91 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
2. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 435, 452 (1892).
3. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3)(emphasis added).
4. 1 G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 1 at 1-2 (rev. 2d ed. 1984); 1 Scorr
ON TRUSTS, § 1, at 1-2 (W. Fratcher 4th ed. 1987)[hereinafter Scorr]. In the immediate
context, the quoted section of the Montana Constitution expresses a trust relationship, and,
as with the beds and banks of navigable waters, if the need for a "settlor" is felt, the United
States may fill that need. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49, 57 (1894):
[T]he title and the dominion of the tide waters and the soil under them, in each
colony, passed by the royal charter to the grantees as "a trust for the common use
of the new community about to be established"; and, upon the American Revolu-
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ship is called a "public trust."
The history and development of the public trust doctrine from
Justinian through the Magna Charta to modern applications has
been set forth so many times in recent articles that it would be
superfluous to do it again here.' It should be sufficient merely to
note that the doctrine does exist, and it is being applied. Also, as
with other legal doctrines, it is being molded and adapted to serve
modern contexts and developing needs.'
tion, vested absolutely in the people of each State "for their own common use...

...Upon the American Revolution, these rights, charged with a like trust,
were vested in the original States ....
Upon the acquisition of a Territory by the United States ... the same title
and dominion passed to the United States, for the benefit of the whole people,
and in trust for the several States to be ultimately created out of the Territory.
The new States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the Constitution. have the same right as the original States ....
One prominent author emphasizes the need for a third party (settlor) over the continuing two-party relationship. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENvTL. L. 527 (1989). There is certainly merit in Huffman's
technical argument that the law of easements is more appropriate than the law of trusts.
That conclusion, however, may not be so important, desirable or necessary as he asserts. It
is true that the conventional trust initially involves three parties, but commonly when the
trust is created there are only two parties because of the death of the settlor. The on-going
relationship, which is all that remains, requires and consists of only two parties: the trustee
and the beneficiary. See 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 248 (1975).
5. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); United Plainsmen Ass'n v.
North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 460 (N.D. 1976); Orion
Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 640, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1022 (1988); Menzer v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis. 2d 70, 81-82, 186 N.W.2d 290, 296
(1971).
6. See, e.g., Symposium on the Public Trust Doctrine and the American West: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 19 ENvrTL. L., No. 3 (1980)[hereinafter American West];'Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law and Management: A Symposium, 14 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 181 (1980)[hereinafter A Symposium]; UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CENTER, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE

A PRACTICAL SYMPOSIUM (Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1988) (conference proceedings available from the Law Center)[hereinafter UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO] as just a few
WESTERN UNITED STATES:

of many representative sources.
7. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707
P.2d 441 (1985); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho
622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983); Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss.
1986), aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); United
Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D.
1976); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979); Orion Corp. v.
State, 109 Wash. 2d 621; 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
8. Judge Cardozo wrote:
As the years'have gone by, and as I have reflected more and more upon the nature
of the judicial process, I have become reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have
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The above quoted passage from the Montana Constitution is
merely a restatement of the common law, statutory law or constitutional law of every western state.' It is not new and it is not
startling here nor elsewhere. Private persons do not own the water
in the streams, but they, along with other members of the public,
have the right to its use. The water is also subject to appropriation
for beneficial uses.' 0 Therefore, the people may appropriate waters
for beneficial uses and they may also float and fish in the flowing
waters of nearly all of the states in the West."
Additionally, where inland waters are navigable for title purposes (i.e., under the federal test)' 2 the state acquired title to the
grown to see it as inevitable. I have grown to see that the process in its highest
reaches is not discovery, but creation; and that the doubts and misgivings, the
hopes and fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs of death and the pangs
of birth, in which principles that have served their day expire, and new principles
are born.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 166-67 (1921). Furthermore,
[t]he law regarding the public use of property held in part for the benefit of
the public must change as the public need changes. The words of Justice Cardozo,
expressed in a different context nearly a half-century ago, are relevant today in
our application of this law: "We may not suffer it to petrify at the cost of its
animating principle."
Stone, supra note 1, at 202 (quoting Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490, 494, 135 N.E. 861,
862 (1922)(Cardozo, J.)).
9. The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions of the eighteen Western
states (Hawaii is omitted) are set forth in Stone, supra note 1, at 242-45.
10. Id.
11. See People v. Sweetser, 72 Cal. App. 3d 278, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1977); Hitchings v.
Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976);
People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971); Southern Idaho Fish &
Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974); Elder v. Delcour,
364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley
Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945); Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921);
Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969); Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625, 56 P.2d 1158
(1936); J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Division of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah
1982); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
878 (1970); Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wash. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968); Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash.
2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). Contra People v.
Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025 (1979).
12. The words "navigable" and "navigability" have been used in different contexts,
and their meanings are different when the context is different. For purposes of determining
title to the beds of waters, i.e., whether the state acquired title when it acquired statehood
(or independence from the Crown, in the case of the thirteen original states), the federal test
laid down in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870), governs:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible
of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water.
This test is applied as of the date of acquiring statehood. If a stream met these conditions
at that time, then title to the beds and banks passed to the new state. Otherwise title re-

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1991

3

110

Montana Law Review, Vol. 52 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 9

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

beds and banks on the date that the state acquired statehood.", As
in the case of lands underlying the oceans and bordering the
oceans to high tide (at least),14 so in the case of the beds and banks
of such navigable rivers and streams, the state's title is held in
trust for the use and benefit of the public. 5 Unless there is a clear
and imperative reason, and unless the loss to the public is minimal
and outweighed by other public policy considerations neither the
courts nor the legislature can divest the beneficiaries of this trust
from their interest in and use of the trust property.'"
But courts and legislatures do have a role, as does any manager of trust property, to oversee and regulate the uses of the trust
mained in the federal government and would pass to a private owner who obtained a federal
patent to the land.
For purposes of the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Daniel Ball test,
involving usability for commerce, applies. Indeed the Daniel Ball case involved a commerce
clause issue. But, according to The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874), and as stated in
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940):
Although navigability to fix ownership of the river bed or riparian rights is determined ... as of the formation of the Union in the original states or the admission
to statehood of those formed later, navigability, for the purpose of the regulation
of commerce, may later arise.
Id. at 408 (citations omitted).
Similarly, for admiraltyjurisdiction, the commerce test is used, but jurisdiction may be
extended over places formerly nonnavigable. Marine Transit Corp. v.'Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263,
268, 271-72 (1932); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 28 (1903); Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S.
629, 632 (1884).
Then there are the various state tests of navigability to determine the usability of a
stream or lake for public recreational purposes. These vary from state to state.
So, there are different meanings of navigability, and the phrase in the text above: "navigable for title purposes (i.e., under the -federal test)" is for the purpose of making clear that
it is the first meaning referred to herein, involving The Daniel Ball, that is intended, as well
as to alert the reader that there is more than one meaning.
13. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661,
666 (1891); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 471, 477-78 (1850); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 220 (1845); Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11 (1842).
14. The public's rights in some states have included the dry sand beaches. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978). In Oregon, the
public's right extends to dry sand areas adjacent to the ocean up to the upland vegetation
line by virtue of the common-law doctrine of "custom." McDonald v. Halvorson, 308 Or.
340, 359, 780 P.2d 714, 724 (1989) (including "gravel beaches, beaches strewn with or even
made up of boulders, and other areas adjacent to the foreshore....." But in this case, the
beach did not abut the ocean; so although the doctrine was approved, it did not apply.);
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 587, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969).
15. See supra notes 2 and 13.
16. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892); National Audubon Soc'y
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709, 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 361, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976). See also supra note 6.
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property so that it may best serve the beneficiaries.1 7 The public
may be restricted so that the property does not become over used
or abused; and the property may be dedicated to a public use that
necessarily excludes some other public uses.' 8 As a matter of legislative power, the title to trust property may be conveyed into private ownership,' 9 but the state cannot convey more than it owned.
The state that held the land subject to a trust can only convey that
land for purposes consistent with that trust. 0
II.

THE CURRAN AND HILDRETH CASES

A.

The Waters

The foregoing general description of the trust relationship is
neither new nor difficult to deal with regarding property owned by
the state for the use of its people.2 ' So the Montana Supreme
Court's decisions in the Curran22 and Hildreth23 cases, to the extent that they dealt with the water of the State of Montana, were
not innovative, nor were they intrusive upon private rights. It is
inconceivable that landowners have not always been aware that the
streams flowing by or through their property were public waters.
Even before the admission to the Union of any of the Western
states,2 ' the miners developed local rules to control the use of
water. Institutional control was confirmed in the Lode Mining Act
of 1866,25 the Desert Land Act of 1877,2e and explained in the Bea17.

G.

supra note 4, at §§ 541-50; 2 SCOTT, supra note 4, at §§ 89-111; 1
169-83 (1959).
18. See Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Department of Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432
P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968); Boone v. Kingsbury, 206
Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 517 (1929); City of Madison v. State, 1
Wis. 2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957); State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d
71 (1957); City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927).
19. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 375
(1977); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382 (1891); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324,
338 (1876). See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971);
People ex rel. Webb v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); Cook v. Dabney,
70 Or. 529, 139 P. 721 (1914); Rhode Island Motor Co. v. City of Providence, 55 A. 696 (R.I.
1903); City of Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319, 143 S.W.2d 1028 (1940).
20. See Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622,
630, 671 P.2d 1085, 1093 (1983); People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 7981, 360 N.E.2d 773, 780-81 (1976); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); supra notes 18 and 19.
21. See supra notes 1-3.
22. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163
(1984).
23. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d
1088 (1984).
24. Except for Texas, which was admitted in 1845.
25. Ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 253 (1866)(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 51 (1988))(explicitly recogBOGERT,

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §§
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ver PortlandCement case." As to the waters, Curran and Hildreth
merely followed the state constitution, which in turn merely stated
what the law would be without the above-quoted constitutional
28

provision.

B.

The Lands

In the Curran case, the trial court held that the public has a
right to use the streambed of the Dearborn River up to the high
water mark as it flows through Curran's property.2 9 The trial court
was affirmed by the Montana Supreme Court, but in its ensuing
discussion, the Supreme Court spoke only of the public's use of the
waters up to the high water mark. The Curran decision found that
the Dearborn River was navigable for title purposes (the federal
test)30 and thus the state acquired ownership of the bed and banks
up to high water mark when it acquired statehood." In 1895, however, by case law32 and statute, 3 title to the land between high and

low water was said to be vested in the adjacent landowner, but
that had no effect upon the public's use of the water.
Because the state owns the bed between low water marks of
navigable (for title) streams, there is no room for an argument that
the public may be excluded from the use of the bed of the Dearborn River, by wading or other reasonable means.34 But, what
about the nature of the title to the land between high and low
water? The title to that land had belonged to the state for the use
of the public," but the state, by case and statute, gratuitously connizing local rights to the "use of water for mining, agriculture, manufacturing, or other
purposes").
26. Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877)(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1982)).
27. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 155
(1935).
28. See supra note 11.
29. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 210 Mont. 38, 55, 682 P.2d
163, 172 (1984).
30. Id. at 43-44, 682 P.2d at 166. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
31. Curran, 210 Mont. at 45, 682 P.2d at 166.
32. Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 422, 39 P. 517, 519 (1895).
33. MoNr. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 (1989).
34. But see discussion of Gait v. State ex rel. Department of Fish, Wildlife &. Parks,
225 Mont. 142, 731 P.2d 912 (1987), commencing in text at infra note 80.
Montana's "angling statute" (MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305 (1989)) permits public use of
the adjacent banks of navigable waters for purposes of fishing. If that is constitutionally
permissible, then other members of the public should have equal use of the banks if they are
not being a nuisance to fishermen. Conversely, if other members of the public cannot use
the banks because of private ownership, then neither should the anglers.
35. See supra notes 2, 12, and 13.
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ferred title to the upland riparian owners.3 6 It was a title subject to
a public trust. As will be discussed later, the conferring of that title
to the riparian landowner (if Gibson and the legislation are
honored)8 7 is only that: passage of the title that the state had. That
title was subject to public uses. It still is.38
The Hildreth case differs from the Curran case in that there
was no determination of navigability for title (the federal test) and
thus no determination of title to the bed or banks of the
Beaverhead River. The Montana Supreme Court said: "Public use
of the waters and the bed and banks of the Beaverhead up to the
ordinary high water mark was determined, not title."' 9 The court
added: "Under Montana law, the public has the right to use the
Beaverhead and its bed and banks up to the ordinary high water
mark, with additional, narrowly limited rights to portage around
barriers. ,,40

Because the Hildreth case did not find that the state had title
to the bed and banks of the Beaverhead, these statements of the
court must be applicable where the bed and banks are in private
ownership. So by these declarations the Montana Supreme Court
quite clearly found a public interest not only in the publicly owned
waters of the state, but also in the private titles to the lands-the
beds and banks-up to the high water mark.
C. The Decision in Perspective: Historically and
Contemporaneously
Several articles and cases discuss the public trust as it applies
to the beds and coastlines of the sea,4 1 and as it applies to inland
36. See supra notes 32 and 33.
37. In Galt, 225 Mont. 142, 731 P.2d 912 and discussed in the text beginning at infra
note 80, Justice Sheehy's dissent included this statement:
The definition by the legislature in 1933 of the right to use the streambeds up
to the high water mark for the purpose of fishing is an indirect recognition of the
legislature that Section 70-16-301, MCA, is not worth the paper it is written on
insofar as it applies to the streambeds between high water marks on navigable
streams.
Gait, 225 Mont. at 158, 731 P.2d at 922. See also infra text accompanying note 52.
38. See infra note 53 and accompanying text. See also supra note 20.
39. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 211 Mont. 29, 39, 684 P.2d
1088, 1093 (1984)(emphasis added).
40. Id. at 40, 684 P.2d at 1094.
41. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1971); Morse
v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979); Bowlby v. Shively, 22 Or.
410, 30 P. 154 (1892), aff'd, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Porro, Invisible Boundary-Privateand Sovereign Marshland Interests, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 513 (1970); Taylor, Patented Tidelands: A Naked Fee?, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 420 (1972); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A
Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970); Comment, Private
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waters of the states.42 However, there is very little discussion of
public rights in the beds and banks of streams where those beds
and banks are held by private titles because the streams are nonnavigable for title (the federal test). s
Commencing with the most fundamental and ancient concept,
we may start with the proposition that the seas are common to
all." There is also a presumption that the ocean beds belong to the
public up to high water.4" But there have been numerous conveyances of the shorelines and the beds of bays into private
ownership. 6
Conveyances of tidelands, shorelines, and beds of the ocean
and its bays must be pursuant to legislative authorization. 7 Courts
look with disfavor, however, upon private acquisition of public
property and will scrutinize the statutory authority to ascertain
the legislative intent. 48 Unless the statute is unmistakably clear
that the grantee is intended to hold the property free of all public
interest (the jus publicum as well as the jus privatum), the
grantee will hold the land subject to the public rights of use, which
49
the grantee cannot obstruct.
It is not surprising, then, that case law supports public use of
these beds and tidelands regardless of whether the title is in the
public (the state) or in private ownership. 50 With regard to navigable (for title) inland lakes and rivers, title to the beds and banks
Fills in Navigable Waters: A Common Law Approach, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 225 (1972).
42. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v.
Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983); United Plainsmen Ass'n
v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976); American
West, supra note 6; A Symposium, supra note 6; UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, supra note 6.
43. There is some discussion of this in Carvell, North Dakota Waterways: The Public's Right of Recreation and Questions of Title, 64 N.D.L. REv. 7, 68-70 (1988). See also
Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 570-71, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 830, 836-37 (1976); Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 848, 269 S.W.2d 17, 26 (1954).
44. "By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the air, running
water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea." J. INST. 2.1.1; Hale, de Jure Maris,
(1667, first publ., 1787) in MOORE, A HISTORY AND LAW OF THE FORESHORE AND SEA SHORE
370 (3d ed. 1888).
45. See supra note 1.
46. 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 1, at § 41 at 194-95, §§ 44, 45, at 214-23. See also cases
cited supra note 19.
47. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 524, 606 P.2d 362, 366, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, 331, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); People ex rel. Webb v. California Fish Co.,
166 Cal. 576, 587-88, 596-97, 138 P. 79, 83-84, 87-88 (1913).
48. See City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 524, 606 P.2d at 366, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 331;
People ex rel. Webb, 166 Cal. at 587-88, 596-97, 138 P. at 83-84, 87-88. See generally Sax,
supra note 6; supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
49. See authorities cited supra note 48.
50. Id.
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became vested in each state upon its acquisition of statehood.5 '
Again, the title was held by the state for the use of the public-a
public trust. Again, there were conveyances by the states of some
beds and banks.52 The courts' treatment of these conveyances paralleled their treatment of conveyances of the seabeds and tidelands. 3 In Montana and California, by essentially identical statutes, the title to all of the banks between high and low water
marks of the navigable inland lakes and streams were gratuitously
conceded to the adjacent private owners. 5 ' These gratuitous concesssions of public lands were considered at an early date in Montana, and quite recently in California. In Gibson v. Kelly, 55 in 1895,

Montana recognized the private title, saying: "It is true that while
the abutting owner owns to the low-water mark on navigable rivers, still the public have certain rights of navigation and fishery
upon the river and upon the strip in question."56 The public's in-

terest in, and ability to use the banks of navigable streams is, of
course, much greater and broader today than it was in 1895.
The California statute57 came under review in separate actions
decided on the same day by the California Supreme Court. The
two cases involved the title to the land between high and low water
surrounding Clear Lake5 and Lake Tahoe. 9 The cases are so similar, that a quote from only one of them is sufficient:
We come, then, to the question whether the grant of lands
between high and low water made by section 830 to riparian landholders is free of the trust described in City of Berkeley. It is well
settled that if the state holds these lands in trust for the benefit
of the public, its conveyance of title to private persons does not
necessarily free the property from the burden of the public trust.
Instead, unless the conveyance is made for the purpose of promoting trust goals, the grantee takes title subject to the rights of
the public.

51. See supra notes 12-13.
52. See supra notes 19-20.
53. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance,
Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983); People ex rel.
Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976).
54. CAL. CIv. CODE § 830 (West 1982); REv. CODES MONT. § 67-712 (1947) (now codified
at MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-301 (1989)).

55. 15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517 (1895).
56. Id. at 423, 39 P. at 519 (emphasis added).
57. CAL. CIv. CODE § 830 (West 1982).
58. State v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
59. State v. Superior Court (Fogarty), 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981).
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.. In Marks v. Whitney, we held that, although early cases
had expressed the scope-of the public's right in tidelands as encompassing navigation, commerce and fishing, the permissible
range of public uses is far broader, including the right to hunt,
bathe or swim, and the right to preserve the tidelands in their
natural state.
..Nothing in the language of section 830 requires a conclusion that riparian landholders take free of the public's rights in
the lands between low and high water in navigable lakes and
streams. We conclude, therefore, that Lyon's title to such lands is
impressed with the public trust.6 0
From these precedents in California and Montana regarding
private titles to the banks of navigable lakes and streams, the
holding in the Hildreth case,6 1 applying the same rule to the private titles in the banks and beds of non-navigable waters can be
viewed in perspective. The waters themselves clearly belong to the
public, and are not in trespass although they flow over private
lands.6 2 The state holds the waters in trust for the public, and has
an easement over the lands, in favor of the public, up to high water
mark for public uses, stemming from the flow of the water over
privately owned beds and banks.6 3 There is an easement over private lands to the high water mark, in favor of the state for the flow
of its water and the use by the public."
The extent of the public's right to use this easement depends
upon the susceptibility of each stream to particular public uses.
The thought was expressed in Hildreth this way:
Under the 1972 Constitution, the only possible limitation of
use can be the characteristics of the waters themselves. Therefore,
no owner of property adjacent to State-owned waters has the
right to control the use of those waters as they flow through his
property. The public has the right to use the waters and the bed
and banks up to the ordinary high water mark.
Hildreth's claim for inverse condemnation is based upon the
60.

Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d at 226, 229, 231, 625 P.2d at 248, 250, 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 705,

707, 708 (citation omitted).
61. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d
1088 (1984).
62. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961). See also cases cited supra note
11.
63. See People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971); Southern
Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974).
64. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d at 1050, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 454; Southern Idaho Fish & Game
Ass'n, 96 Idaho at 362, 528 P.2d at 1297.
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theory that there has been a taking of his land without compensation. Such is not the case. Public use of the waters and the bed
and banks of the Beaverhead up to the ordinary high water mark
was determined, not title.
As discussed previously in this opinion and extensively in
Curran....
ownership of the streambed is irrelevant to determination of public use of the waters for recreational purposes. Navigability for recreational use is limited, under the Montana Constitution, only by the capabilities of the waters themselves for such
use. Hildreth has never owned and does not now own the waters
of the Beaverhead River. Under Montana law, the public has the
right to use the Beaverhead and its bed and banks up to the ordinary high water mark, with additional, narrowly limited rights to
portage around barriers.
The Beaverhead River is navigable for recreational pur...
poses and the public has a right to use its bed and banks up to
the ordinary high water mark with limited right to portage across
private property in order to bypass barriers in the waters. 65
III.

THE STREAM ACCESS LAW

In the aftermath of the Curran and Hildreth cases the Montana legislature in 1985 passed the "Stream Access Law" 6 in order
to further define the boundaries of the public easement and the
permissible activities therein. Briefly, it established two classes of
streams: Class I waters, which are those that would be classed as
navigable for title under the federal test;e7 and Class II waters,
which are "all surface waters that are not class I waters, except
lakes." 68 (Lakes are not dealt with in the statute.) 9
65. Hildreth, 211 Mont. at 35-41, 684 P.2d at 1091-94 (emphasis added)(citation omitted). The right of portage was referred to several times in both the Curran and Hildreth
cases. In the case of easements, the holder of the dominant tenement (easement holder) not
only has the right of use of the easement itself, but also the right to make incidental use of
land and materials outside the boundaries of the easement itself if that is necessary in order
to use the easement. This additional right is called a "secondary easement," needed to make
use of the primary right. Laden v. Atkeson, 112 Mont. 302, 116 P.2d 881 (1941). The "right
of portage" would come under this doctrine. Where the public owns not merely an easement
but the title to the beds and banks, there should be no less a right of portage by necessity.
If it were needed, the doctrine of secondary easements could be used for the benefit of
bathers, fishermen, and others to support their use of the banks and beds of streams as
necessary to their enjoyment of the waters themselves. But because the easement itself, in
favor of the public, or the trust itself, includes the banks and beds, resort to a secondary
easement is unnecessary except where portages are required.

66.
67.
68.

MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

§§ 23-2-301 to -322 (1989).
§ 23-2-301(2) (1989).
§ 23-2-301(3) (1989).
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As to the boundaries, the act states:
"Ordinary high-water mark" means the line that water impresses on land by covering it for sufficient periods to cause physical characteristics that distinguish the area below the line from
the area above it[,] .. .[e.g.,] deprivation of the soil of substan-

tially all terrestrial
vegetation and destruction of its agricultural
70
vegetative value.

"Recreational use" was defined quite broadly, and included
hunting, boating in flotation devices or motorized craft, and other
activities." In a subsequent section, big game hunting was limited
to use of a long bow or shotgun;72 overnight camping was permitted except within sight of or within 500 yards of any occupied
dwelling, whichever is less;73 and similarly the placement of any
permanent duck blind, boat moorage, or other object was permitted except within sight of or within 500 yards of an occupied dwelling, whichever is less.7 '
Although recreational uses were described without regard to
the characteristics of the streams in which they were permitted,75
the statute went on to restrict public uses in Class II waters. 6
With respect to these, the public was prohibited (without the permission of the landowner) from big game hunting, overnight camping, the placement of seasonal objects, or other activities that are
not primarily water-related pleasure activities as described (very
broadly and inclusively) under "recreational use.

'7 7

By negative

pregnant, as well as the preceding description of "recreational
use," all of these -activities would be permissible in Class I waters. 78
The statute also provided procedures for limiting or prohibiting
public use and for identifying streams within Class II waters that
are not capable of recreational use, or are capable of only a limited
use to which the public may be restricted.79
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

MONT.CODE
MONT. CODE
MONT. CODE
MONT. CODE
MONT. CODE
MONT. CODE
MONT. CODE
MONT. CODE
Id.
MONT. CODE
MONT. CODE

ANN.

ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

§
§
§
§
§
§

§
§

23-2-310 (1989).
23-2-301(9) (1989).
23-2-301(10) (1989).
23-2-302(2)(d) (1989).
23-2-302(2)(e) (1989).
23-2-302(2)(f) (1989).
23-2-301(10) (1989). See also supra note 71.
23-2-302(3) (1989).

ANN. §§ 23-2-301(10) and -302(1)
ANN. § 23-2-302(5) (1989).
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IV.

GALT V. STATE EX REL. DEPARTMENT OF

PARKS

80

FISH,

WILDLIFE AND

In the aftermath of Curran, Hildreth, and the Stream Access
Law, some landowners led by Montana state Senator Jack E. Galt
brought a declaratory judgment action against the State Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks to have the statute declared unconstitutional as a taking of private property without just compensation."1 Although the trial court granted summary judgment for
the Department, the Montana Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Morrison, writing for the court, upheld most of the
statute, but found several important public interest provisions unconstitutional: (1) the permission to hunt big game, regardless of
the means used, because that is "not a necessary part of the easement granted the public for its enjoyment of the water; ' '8 2 (2) over-

night camping and (3) the placement of permanent objects must
be restricted to situations where necessary for the public's use of
the water itself; 83 and (4) the responsibility to provide for portage
routes around artificial barriers cannot be placed on the landowner." ' (A barrier is, generally, a "manmade obstacle to the natural flow of water.

' 85)

Chief Justice Turnage concurred with Justice Morrison's reasoning and result, but did not think that the Public Trust Doctrine

was necessary in the Curran, Hildreth, or this Galt case. 6 Justice
Gulbrandson concurred principally on the basis that the beds and

banks of Class II waters are in private ownership and so the legislature had no authority to legislate their use.8 1 Justice Hunt dissented because he agreed with the District Court that Curran and
Hildreth had already disposed of the issues of this case, and the
Stream Access Law was a proper constitutional legislative response
to those cases. 88
Justice Sheehy recognized that the challenged law divided the
state's waters into Class I and Class II waters, and as to the former, the state has title to the bed and banks of those navigable
(for title) streams.8 9 As to them, then, talk of an "easement" is
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

225 Mont. 142, 731 P.2d 912 (1987).
Id. at 144, 731 P.2d at 913.
Id. at 148, 731 P.2d at 916.
Id.
Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-301(l) (1989).
Galt, 225 Mont. at 149, 731 P.2d at 916 (Turnage, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 151, 731 P.2d at 917 (Gulbrandson, J., concurring).
Id. at 151-55, 731 P.2d at 917-20 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
Id. at 155-61, 731 P.2d at 920-24 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
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irrelevant: "When the state legislature acts within its sphere to
regulate the use of property which the state owns, we should respect the legislative discretion."90 He would uphold the entire
statute.
V.

COMMENTARY

Although the majority opinion in the Galt case purported to
follow the Curran and Hildreth cases, there can be no mistaking
that there was a clear departure, in the direction of limiting and
restricting the prior two cases. The general tenor of Justice Morrison's opinion is epitomized by this quote:
The public trust doctrine in Montana's Constitution grants
public ownership in water not in beds and banks of streams.
While the public has the right to use the water for recreational
purposes and minimal use of underlying and adjoining real estate
essential to enjoyment of its ownership in water, there is no attendant right that such use be as convenient, productive, and
comfortable as possible.
The public has a right of use up to the high water mark, but
only such use as is necessary to utilization of the water itself. We
hold that any use of the bed and banks must be of minimal
impact. 1
So in the majority's view, the public's interest, or right, extends only to the water; the use of the bed and banks is in the
nature of a secondary easement-only as absolutely necessary. 2
This is a very restrictive and questionable view of public rights
and, with respect to Class I waters, it seems indefensible. 3
The only use that the majority opinion made of any recognition that there are two classes of water in the statute was in connection with duck blinds, which may be necessary for the public
enjoyment of "certain large bodies of water [but] the right to construct permanent improvements on any commercially navigable
stream does not follow." 9 " That single recognition of what the legislature called "Class I Waters" is inadequate. Moreover, there was
no explanation of why the legislature cannot legislate what public
90. Id. at 159, 731 P.2d at 923.
91. Id. at 147, 731 P.2d at 915.
92. Id. See also supra note 65.
93. Because the state owns the water and the bed, and either owns or absolutely controls the use of the banks. See supra notes 56-60. See also supra note 37 for a quotation
from Justice Sheehy's dissent in the Gait case regarding the ineffectiveness of Montana
Code Annotated section 70-16-301 (1989).
94. Galt, 225 Mont. at 148, 731 P.2d at 916.
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uses can be made of property owned by the state in trust for the
public. Without some good explanation, the statement is both inadequate and unsound. There is simply insufficient recognition of
both the public's rights in the banks and beds of navigable (for
title) waters and, needless to say, the effect those rights have had
on the banks and beds of non-navigable (for title) waters.
The legislature dealt separately with two different types of
streams: the Class I streams, which are navigable for title purposes,
95
and of which the beds and use of the banks are for the public;
and Class II streams, of which the beds and banks are privately
owned.96 In the majority opinion, except for minimal and incidental uses that are necessary for the public to use the water, any such
use of beds or banks over privately owned property is a trespass."
That is a restrictive view indeed. Beyond that, according to the
majority, any substantial public use of publicly owned beds or
banks is a trespass!9"
The Stream Access Law defines "surface water" to include "a
natural water body, its bed, and its banks up to the ordinary highwater mark."9 9 With respect to Class II waters, where the beds and
banks are privately owned, it permitted general water-related public recreational uses, specifically excluding only big game hunting,
overnight camping and the placement or creation of any seasonal
object. 10 0 To the extent of these exclusions it deferred to the peace,
quiet, and privacy of the riparian owner. But members of the public could use the water, beds and banks for fishing, fowling, swimming, floating, picnicking, and other temporary water related
activities.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-301(2) (1989).
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-301(3) (1989).
97. Gait, 225 Mont. at 142, 731 P.2d at 912.
98. Trespass to whom? Some undefined offense to the upland landowner who holds
no title to the bed or bank (or possibly a bare title to the bank, held for the public)? The
court only said:
The public trust doctrine in Montana's Constitution grants public ownership
in water not in beds and banks of streams. While the public has the right to use
the water for recreational purposes and minimal use of underlying and adjoining
real estate essential to enjoyment of its ownership in water, there is no attendant
right that such use be as convenient, productive, and comfortable as possible.
The public has a right of use up to the high water mark, but only such use as
is necessary to utilization of the water itself. We hold that any use of the bed and
banks must be of minimal impact.
Gait, 225 Mont. at 147, 731 P.2d at 915 There is nothing to indicate that this quote is
restricted to Class II streams, and the context does indeed include Class I as well as Class II
streams.
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-301(12) (1989)(emphasis added).
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(3) (1989).

95.
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Because any "trust" under which the riparian owners hold title along non-navigable streams is a dry, passive one wherein the
title holder has neither management duties nor private rights, the
older, traditional and conventional law of trusts and real property
would classify it as an easement. 10 1 The riparian owner would then
hold the servient tenement for the dominant tenement that is in
the public. But it is more consistent or parallel with the language
of cases from the seacoasts and navigable streams to classify the
interest of riparian owners along non-navigable streams as a
trust.1 0 2 These owners hold their title as trustees of the public trust
with respect to their ownership of subaqueous land. They hold
these lands in trust for the public uses discussed above.
The landowner never did have the right to interfere with the
flow of the waters to high water mark.10 3 The waters themselves
were never in trespass within their banks, and the owner never
could use the banks in ways that would interfere with the flow of
the water.1 04 He never had an unburdened ownership of that
land, 105 and the soles of people's feet on that land take nothing
101. Discussed generally under the Statute of Uses in G. BOGERT, supra note 4, at § 4;
1 Sco'rr, supra note 4, at §§ 67-68; 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §§ 67-69 (1959).
102. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26
Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Marks v.
Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); People ex rel. Webb v.
California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis.
261, 145 N.W. 815 (1914). The difference is more one of theory and terminology rather than
of practical result.
103. This is in the field of tort law. See Formicove, Inc. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
207 Mont. 189, 673 P.2d 469 (1983); LeMunyon v. Gallatin Valley Ry., 60 Mont. 517, 199 P.
915 (1921), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Formicove, Inc. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
207 Mont. 189, 673 P.2d 469 (1983); Fordham v. Northern Pac. Ry., 30 Mont. 421, 76 P.
1040 (1904).
104. See cases cited supra note 103.
105. "The foreshore is truly sui generis and the location of land capacity concerning it
has to be settled by considerations different from those applicable to any area of our dry
land." 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 163 at 704 (1989).
It is the settled rule in Michigan that "the title of the riparian owner extends to
the middle line of the lake or stream of the inland waters." . . . Whatever the
nature of the interest of a riparian owner in the submerged lands in front of his
upland bordering on a public navigable water, his title is not as full and complete
as his title to fast land which has no direct connection with the navigation of such
water. It is a qualified title, a bare technical title, not at his absolute disposal, as is
his upland, but to be held at all times subordinate to such use of the submerged
lands and of the waters flowing over them as may be consistent with or demanded
by the public right of navigation.
Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900)(citation omitted).
It appears that the law is well past reliance on cujus est salum ejus est ad
coelum. The better course would be to restore the Roman concept of public right
and include within navigational rights walking, wading and pushing or pulling
craft across shallows, riffles, rapids and other obstructions.
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from him.
The Stream Access Law recognizes that on some streams some
or all public uses may be inappropriate because of the characteristics of the stream, and impliedly recognizes that there may be an
abuse, overuse, or nuisance caused by members of the public.106
For those situations, it empowers the Fish and Game Commission
to regulate, limit, restrict or prohibit public use.' 0 7 Otherwise, the
landowner must look to the enhanced quality of life on riparian
property for his reward.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Galt'0 8 case is currently the law in Montana. Notwithstanding the Stream Access Law, 109 even on navigable waters
where the state owns the beds and the public has the right of navigation and fishery between the high and low water mark, the public must make only minimal and incidental use of the beds and
banks. 10 Moreover, the legislature no longer has plenary authority
to set policy or legislate as to the uses of such state owned land.
Such a new restriction of legislative freedom and responsibility
suggests a need for the Montana Supreme Court, in a subsequent
case, to reconsider and refine what it has done.
Under the Galt case, there seems to be little distinction between Class I and Class II waters and their beds and banks. If
there is to be such a restrictive view of public uses of Class II waters, beds and banks, then a distinction should be made in favor of
the public on Class I streams.
The Hildreth case"" should be read again. If the Constitution
is to be given full effect with respect to public use of the waters of
the state, and if the public interest is to be protected as it is in the
public trust doctrine, then the legislature's view, as expressed in
the Stream Access Law, should be respected and given more
weight than it was accorded by the temporal majority of the 1987
Montana Supreme Court.

Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient PrerogativeBecomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 195, 231 (1980)(citations omitted).
106. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(5) (1989).
107. Id.
108. Gait v. State ex rel. Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 225 Mont. 142, 731
P.2d 912 (1987).
109. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to -310 (1989).
110. Galt, 225 Mont. at 148, 731 P.2d at 915.
111. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d
1088 (1984).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1991

17

Montana Law Review, Vol. 52 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 9

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/9

18

